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Abstract - Since the end of the eighties the Becker and Murphy model of rational addiction has 
been the dominant approach to estimate addiction e ects. The main implication of the model is that 
public policy, in principle, should not interfere with a fully rational behaviour. However, the 
additional public health care costs smokers impose on non smokers could be internalised using price 
mechanisms, as the long run price elasticity of demand is supposed to be, according to this model, 
significantly higher than the short run one and higher than that obtained from alternative models of 
addiction, such as the habit persistence model. In this paper we estimate the demand for Tobacco 
and related products in Italy using PANEL data supplied by ISTAT for the twenty Italian regions. 
The rational addiction model is used to estimate addiction e ects following the methodological 
approach suggested by Baltagi and Levin (2001). The myopic addiction model is also estimated as 
an alternative way of modelling addiction e ects. These data seem to support the rational addiction 
model, although the results are not clearcut. We have thus estimated the same models using Time 
Series of per-capita Households Tobacco expenditures from the Italian National Accounts. In this 
case, the data strongly support the Rational Addiction model and produce elasticities in line with 
similar case studies. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the end of the eighties the Becker and Murphy model of rational addiction has been
the dominant approach to estimate addiction eﬀects. A rational addictive consumer, a
smoker for instance, is supposed to maximize over the life cycle a stable utility function
and to be fully aware of the future consequences of his or her addiction and chooses to be
an addicted because he or she evaluates the bene￿ts of addiction to be greater than its full
costs. It follows that public policy should not interfere with such fully rational behaviour.
However, the additional public health care costs smokers impose on non smokers could
be internalised using price mechanisms, as the long run price elasticity of demand is
supposed to be signi￿cantly higher than the short run one and higher than elasticities
obtained from the myopic model of addiction, for instance.
In this paper we try to estimate the demand for Tobacco in Italy using the myopic
and the rational model of addiction. Previous Italian studies on Tobacco demand have
been developed in the context of a demand system approach without trying to model
the dynamics of Tobacco demand (Jones and Giannoni-Mazzi, 1996; Caiumi, 1992; Rizzi
2000; Rizzi-Balli 2002)1.
We use a balanced panel of annual data on Tobacco and related products supplied by
ISTAT from 1972 to 2000 for the twenty Italian regions and estimate a single equation
model. The same exercise is carried out using time series of per-capita Households To-
bacco expenditures from 19 6 0t o2 0 0 2a l s os u p p l i e db yI S T A T .W h i l ew i t ht h e￿rst data
set we do not obtain clearcut results, the second data set strongly supports the Becker
model of addiction.
The paper is structured as follows. Economic theories of addiction are brie￿ys u m -
marised in paragraph 2 which also reviews empirical work on the rational addiction
model. Paragraph 3 gives an outline of recent trends in smoking behaviour and smoking
regulation in Italy. In paragraph 4 we present the results obtained from the panel data,
whereas paragraph 5 shows results obtained when using time series. Paragraph 6 draws
some ￿nal considerations.
1an exception is Rizzi, 2000.
12 Theories of Addiction and Empirical Evidence
There is now a signi￿cant body of research on the demand for cigarettes and the eﬀects
of prices on Tobacco consumption. Two diﬀerent groups of studies can be singled out:
conventional studies on cigarettes demand and those that explicitly take into account
the addictive nature of smoking (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000). Conventional studies
on cigarettes demand estimate the eﬀect of prices on consumption without taking into
account the addictive nature of cigarettes consumption, i.e. they use static demand equa-
tions. According to a survey on the ￿Economics of Smoking￿ by Chaloupka and Warner
(2000), the price elasticity estimates from recent studies of this kind fall within the range
-0.14t o- 1.23. In Italy conventional estimates of Tobacco demand, in the context of a
demand system, that allows for substitution among goods after a change in the price of
one of the goods, have been carried out by Jones and Giannoni-Mazzi (1996), Caiumi
(1992), Rizzi (2000), Rizzi-Balli (2002). Jones and Giannoni-Mazzi (1996) estimate a
static demand equation for Tobacco in the context of a demand system approach. The
own price elasticity for Tobacco, evaluated at the sample mean is, on average, -0.33, in
line with the study by Caiumi. Caiumi (1992) included Tobacco as a separate good in an
extensive analysis of the demand for food, that follows a two-stages budgeting allocation
mechanism, based on the linear AIDS model. She reports, for the year 1990, a non com-
pensated, non conditional, direct price elasticity of demand for Tobacco of -0.34. Rizzi
(2000) analyses the relationship between the structure of private ￿nal consumption expen-
ditures in Italy and the recent demographic trends to see how changes in the age structure
of the Italian population aﬀect the level and the composition of ￿nal expenditures. He
uses a QAIDS demand model that follows a 4 stages budgeting allocation process where
the expenditure on Tobacco is decided at the ￿rst stage. He ￿nds a mean (over the pe-
riod 1961-1996) non compensated, non conditional, direct price elasticity of demand for
Tobacco of -0.75. In this study the demand function also includes a dynamic eﬀect due to
habit formation. The habit formation coeﬃcient for Tobacco is quite high and amounts
to 0.595. Rizzi and Balli (2002) estimate short-run price elasticities of demand for a
complete system of demand for non durables, including Tobacco, that incorporates the
eﬀects of demographic variables and rationing. Their mean monthly compensated direct
price elasticity of demand for Tobacco (over the period 1985(1)-2001(6)) is -0.879. Table
1 summarises the main results of previous italian studies on Tobacco demand. Except
for the habit formation eﬀect included in the study by Rizzi (2000) we do not know of
2other Italian studies that take into account the addictive nature of smoking.
Psychological studies of harmful addiction have introduced the three basic dimen-
sions of: gradual adaptation (tolerance); irreversibility (withdrawal) and positive eﬀects
of habits (reinforcement) that are now part of the formal economic models of addictive
behaviour. Tolerance means that a given level of consumption is less satisfying when
past consumption has been greater. Withdrawal denotes the loss of satisfaction follow-
ing consumption cessation. Reinforcement means that greater current consumption of
a good causes its future consumption to rise (Grossman, 1995, p. 157). Starting from
the end of the 50ies, most studies on cigarettes demand have explicitly addressed the
addictive nature of smoking; this has led to the introduction of some sort of dynamics
in the empirical speci￿cation. Economic models of addiction can be divided into three
groups: imperfectly rational models of addictive behaviour; models of myopic addiction
and rational addiction models (Chalopuka and Warner, 2000, p. 1556). Imperfectly
rational addiction models assume stable but inconsistent short-run and long-run prefer-
ences. Chaloupka and Warner point out (2000, p. 1557) that, although these models
foster interesting discussions of some aspects of addictive behaviour, they have not been
applied empirically to cigarette smoking. In myopic addiction models individuals recog-
nize the dependence of current consumption (of an addictive good) on past consumption,
but ignore the impact of current and past choices on future consumption decisions when
making current choices. Empirical application of myopic addiction models are based on
the work of Houthakker and Taylor (1970) and Pollack (1970). In these works the stock
of a commodity2 has a positive impact on its current consumption in the presence of
habit formation if the commodity is non durable. Current consumption positively de-
pends on past consumption according to a ￿xed propensity to habituation or addiction.
More recent examples of habit formation models for cigarette consumption are Baltagi
and Levin (1986 and 1992). In these models, the lagged dependent variable has a habit
interpretation as the speed of adjustment to the equilibrium level of consumption in a
partial adjustment model (Cameron, 1998, p. 53). Other references for the application
of this dynamic speci￿cation to cigarettes consumption can be found in the survey by
Cameron (1998).
The rational addiction theory was formally developed by Becker and Murphy (1988)
(B&M henceforth). Becker objected to the habit persistence or myopic model observing
that rational individuals will notice that they have an addiction and will try to adjust
2Or last period consumption, if we assume a 100% rate of decay for the stock of habits.
3their intertemporal consumption trajectory in an optimal way. The Becker model of ad-
diction assumes a stable lifetime utility function over time, perfect foresight, discounting
of the future at the market interest rate and that smoking has no in￿uence on future
earnings. Becker￿s theoretical model gives rise to a linear diﬀerence demand equation in
which current consumption of an addictive good positively depends, not only on past con-
sumption, but also on the future expected consumption levels. An important implication
of the model is that the long run price elasticity of demand for an addictive good should
be higher than that obtained from the myopic model, as a rational addicts takes also into
account his future behavior when facing current prices for the addictive good. This last
point has very strong policy implications, because it means that, legalization of drugs
use, for instance, and the following price fall, could cause a signi￿cant rise in the demand
for those goods (Becker, Grossman and Murphy, 1994, BGM henceforth), if the price fall
is not ￿anked by an appropriate dissuasive campaign; it also implies that an increase
in the price of Tobacco, for instance, could lead to a signi￿cant fall in consumption in
the long run, thus contradicting the common belief according to which the demand for
addictive goods is not sensitive to price changes.
Another implication of the rational addiction model is that announcements of future
price changes could strongly aﬀect the demand for addictive goods, because smoking in
diﬀerent years are assumed to be complements.
In principle, one could choose between the two models (myopic and rational) through
a test of the statistical signi￿cance of the coeﬃcient on the lead consumption term and
the plausibility of the implied discount rate. However results from the existing empirical
literature are not clearcut.
2.1 Price Elasticities of Demand and Addiction Models
One implication of addiction models, in terms of their consequences for economic policy,
is that the long run price elasticity of demand (LRE) exceeds the short run one (SRE)
and also exceeds responses derived from a static demand function. Moreover, among
addiction models, the long run response obtained from a rational addiction model is
higher than the one obtained from myopic models.
42.1.1 Static Demand Functions
In a static demand function (where no addiction is considered) the short and long run
price elasticities of demand coincide as the equilibrium adjustment to a price change is
immediate. Given the linear demand function Ct = α + θ1Pt + ηt,w h e r eCt is Tobacco
consumption at time t, Pt is Tobacco price and ηt is the stochastic error term, the price
elasticity of demand, calculated at the sample mean, is
LRES = SRES = θ1
P t
Ct
2.1.2 Myopic Demand Functions
A myopic demand function for an addictive good follows a partial adjustment model
where the lagged dependent variable represents a ￿xed propensity to addiction which is
carried over from period to period and its coeﬃcient can be interpreted as the speed
of adjustment to the steady state level of consumption. In this case, following a price
change, we would have an immediate reponse given by the impact multiplier, whereas
the adjustment to the new steady state level of consumption will take place in more than
one period. As a consequence, the long run multiplier (or equilibrium multiplier) will be
greater than the short run one. Following Verbeek (2000, pp. 278-281)l e tC∗
t denote the
optimal or desired level of Ct and assume that
C
∗
t = α + θ1Pt + ηt (1)
The actual value of Ct diﬀers from C∗
t because adjustment to its optimal level corre-
sponding to Pt is not immediate. The adjustment is only partial in the sense that
Ct − Ct−1 =( 1− γ)(C∗
t − Ct−1) where 0 < γ < 1. Substitution gives:
Ct = δ + γCt−1 + φPt + †t (2)
where: δ =( 1− γ)α; φ =( 1− γ)θ1; †t =( 1− γ)ηt
















5so that for γ < 1, LREM >S R E M.
The partial adjustment model is a special case of an Error Correction Model (ECM)which
says that the change in Ct is due to the change in Pt plus an error correction term. Sub-
tracting Ct−1 from both sides of (2) and adding and subtracting from the RHS φPt−1
gives:
∆Ct = φ∆Pt − (1 − γ)[Ct−1 − α − θ1Pt − ηt] (3)
This is an example of ECM where the change in Ct is due to the impact of a change
in Pt, φ∆Pt, plus the equilibrium error in square brackets. When the business cycle eﬀect
is φ∆Pt =0 ,t h eECM gives exactly the partial adjustment model in (2). If Ct−1 >C ∗
the error correction term works to push C back towards its equilibrium level.
2.1.3 Rational Demand Functions
In the Rational Model of Addiction the short and the long run price elasticity of demand
are obtained from the solution of the following second order linear non homogeneous
diﬀerence equation that results from the intertemporal utility maximization problem of
a rational addictive consumer with stable preferences over time (see BGM, appendix A
for details):
Ct= α + θCt−1+θ1Pt+θβCt+1+ηt (4)
where β is the discount factor 1
1+σ and σ i st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea s s u m e dt o
be equal to the interest rate in the rational addiction model. The resulting elasticities,






















1 − θ(1 + β)
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In the rational addiction model the short run price elasticity of demand gives the
p e r c e n t a g ev a r i a t i o ni nt h ec o n s u m p t i o no fa na d d i c t i v eg o o di nt h e￿rst year after a
6permanent change in the current price and all future prices, with past consumption
held constant. The long run price elasticity gives, instead, the percentage change in
consumption following a permanent price change in all time periods (Becker, Grossman
and Murphy, 1991, p. 240).
In the rational addiction model LRER >S R E R ,b u t ,f r o mw h a th a sb e e ns a i d ,i ti s
also: LRER >L R E M >L R E S : the long run response is higher than the short run one
and higher than long run responses obtained from alternative models of Tobacco demand.
2.2 Tests of the Rational Addiction Theory
Rational addiction is pausible when the data accept the hypothesis of forward looking
behaviour, i.e. when the coeﬃcient of the lead consumption term is positive and signi￿-
cant, and when the discount factor has a reasonable value. The results of some empirical
tests of the rational addiction theory, however, cast doubts over the explicative power of
model. Even when the coeﬃcient of the lead consumption term has the right sign and
magnitude, the discount rate, for instance, has unreasonable values in almost any case,
although this is attributed by some (BGM and Baltagi and Griﬃn, 2001)t ot h et y p e
of data used. More speci￿cally, according to Baltagi and Griﬃn (2001, p. 454) ￿...ag-
gregate panel data do not seem likely to provide sharp estimates of the discount rate￿.
Laux (2000, p. 428) claims that this result signals a failure of the rationality hypothesis.
Should the consumers be rational with stable preferences in their smoking decisions, for
instance, the discount rates revealed relative to addictive consumption should approxi-
mate those revealed in their saving or investment decisions. A gap between these two
should be taken as either a signal of time inconsistency or of bounded rationality.
Further, the long run price elasticity of demand is greater than one, in absolute value
(and the demand is thus elastic), only in a few cases, whereas in at least two cases, it
has not been reported because its values turn out to be meaningless (Cameron, 1999 and
Olekalns and Bardsley, 1996).
Lastly, there are at least a few cases (BGM, Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998, and
Cameron, 1999) where the rational addiction model produces uncertain results and the
data seem to ￿t the habit formation model better.
The ￿rst empirical tests of the rational addiction model have been produced by BGM
and Chaloupka (1991). BGM estimate a linear demand function for cigarettes where
current consumption depends on past consumption, on the actual value of future con-
sumption of the addictive good, on the current price of cigarettes and on the unobservables
7et and et+1 that incorporates the impact on utility of unobserved variables that have an
in￿uence on the life cycle3.
Ct = θCt−1 + βθCt+1 + θ1Pt + θ2et + θ3et+1 (5)
Instrumental Variables (IV) methods are often used to estimate this kind of model
because of the endogeneity problem implied by the presence of the lagged and lead de-
pendent variable among the regressors.
In BGM the coeﬃcient associated to future cigarette consumption is positive and
signi￿c a n ta n dt h el o n gr u np r i c ee l a s t i c i t e so fd e m a n da r e ,o na v e r a g e ,- 0 , 7 5 . T h ee s -
timated value of the discount factor4 is implausible in all of the estimates produced5.
On the other hand, the myopic model estimation produces consistent estimates for any
instruments￿ set used. A similar data set is used by Baltagi and Griﬃn (2001)t oe s t i -
mate equation 5. They use two additional estimators: the Foward-Filter ￿rst diﬀerence
2SLS (FD2SLS) and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), besides the traditional
FE2SLS, to overcome the econometric problems caused by the presence of predetermined
or endogenous variables when using panel data. Baltagi and Griﬃn￿s results strongly
support the Rational Addiction hypothesis. Chaloupka (1991) obtains coeﬃcients for
future consumption that are not always signi￿cant; the long run price elasticity of de-
mand is rather low (-0,37 on average, for the full sample) and the discount factor is very
high. Similar studies have been carried out by Keeler, Hu, Barnett and Manning (1993),
Waters and Sloan (1995), Olekalns and Bardsley (1996), Duﬀy( 1996), Grossman and
Chaloupka (1998), Grossman, Chaloupka and Sirtalan (1998), Cameron (1997 e 1999),
Labeaga (1999), Bask and Melkersson (2000), Escario and Molina (2001), Gruber and
K￿szegi (2001), Gardes and Starzec (2002) and Baltagi and Griﬃn (2002), among others.
In many of them one gets evidence of forward looking behaviour, but the other results
are not fully consistent with the theory. Gruber and K￿szegi (2001) estimate a demand
function where the demand for Tobacco depends on excise rates rather than prices. They
notice that the assumption according to which consumers can forecast future prices a long
3The e terms are arguments of the utility function and are an intrinsic part of the model. They are
not to be confused with the ut which is the stochastic error term to measure all omitted factors.
4In the Rational Addiction theory, the coeﬃcients associated to past and future consumption are the
same save for the discount factor β = 1
1+σ so that the intertemporal rate of time preference is σ = 1
β −1.
5BGM produce two instrumental variables estimates using two diﬀerent sets of instruments: the ￿rst
includes future prices and future taxes as instruments, the second one excludes them. Their preferred
speci￿cation appears to be the latter. See pages 407 and following for details.
8time in advance is rarely veri￿ed, whereas it is more likely that they will be informed well
in advance of a future increase in the excise rates. Moreover, prices could be endogenous.
It is often the case that these models include ￿xed-eﬀects to capture the variability in
demand due to structural diﬀerences among states included in the panel. However, it can
be that these eﬀects are not truly ￿xed in the long run and that a reduction in cigarettes
consumption is wrongly attributed to price variations over time. If, for any reason, prices
increase the most in those states where demand is decreasing the most, one can get to the
wrong conclusion that future prices are correlated to current consumption6.G r u b e ra n d
K￿szegi (2001) analyse smoking behaviour in the time intervals between the announce-
ment of a variation in excise rates on cigarettes and the time when the new excise rate
becomes eﬀective. Thus only announced variations in excises are taken into account.
They obtain strong evidence of forward looking behaviour. The coeﬃcients associated to
past and future excise rates are positive and signi￿cant7.
Despite the high number of empirical tests realised so far, making comparisons is very
hard due to the heterogeneity of the works relative to data (individual or aggregated,
time series, cross section or panel) and estimators used. Even when the estimator used
is the same, for instance 2SLS, the results seem to change dramatically according to the
instruments￿ set used. In the ￿rst exercise we carry out we replicate the empirical strategy
followed by Baltagi and Griﬃn( 2 0 0 1). This should allow direct comparisons of our results
to theirs. Moreover, Baltagi and Griﬃn adopt consistent and eﬃcient estimators capable
of dealing with the econometric problems faced when using panel data in presence of
endogenous or predetermined variables.
3 Smoking behaviour in Italy
Italy is, according to recent OECD data (2002), one of the OECD countries with a very
high percentage of daily smokers over the population. According to the Italian National
Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT, 2002b) in the year 2000 smokers in Italy were 12.330.000, about
24,9% of the population over 14 years of age. Among those, the abitual smokers (those
that smoke every day) are about 22,9%, whereas heavy smokers (those declaring to smoke
6The most widely used example in the literature is that of a State monopolist who faces a decreasing
demand and thus decides to rise the prices in order to keep ￿scal revenues constant. In this case, using
prices as regressors would lead to the wrong conclusion that smokers are forward looking.
7The values associated to Ct+1 for Gruber and K￿szegi correspond to past and future excise rates
and not to past and future consumption, as for the other empirical works under consideration, becasue
the authors choose a diﬀerent empirical strategy to test for forward looking behaviour.
9more than 20 cigarettes per day) are about 40,9%. Smoking in Italy is highly in￿uenced
by sex, age, location and the level of education attained. There are more male smokers
than females (32% of males smoke against about 18% of females). The highest share
of smokers is registered in the North-West and in Central Italy (26,2%), followed by
the Islands (24,5%), the South (23,8%) and the North-East (23,5%). Smoking is more
widespread in urban areas and the share of smokers seems to decrease as we go from big
to small towns. The smoking habit also appears to be strictly linked to schooling, but
with diﬀerent impacts according to the gender. Among males, the number of smokers is
negatively related to the number of years of education. Among women, the relationship
between smoking and the educational level varies with age. Young women (aged 25 to
44) exhibit a negative relationship between smoking and the educational level. Elder
women (aged more than 65) show a positive relationship between the smoking habit and
the level of education.
Precocious smokers (those who start smoking before reaching 14 years of age) are
more frequent among men: 6,9% of male smokers are precocious smokers against 3,4% of
women. Among women, the share of precocious smokers decreases with age: precocious
smokers are 7,3% of young female smokers; 4% among female smokers aged 25 to 44 and
1,5% of elder female smokers. Men show an opposite relationship between precocious
smoking and age.
A relevant health risk factor is the daily amount of Tobacco smoked. The majority
of Italian smokers (91,9%) declares to smoke daily, i.e. to be an abitual smoker (Lega
Italiana per la Lotta contro i Tumori, 2002). Among daily smokers we can distinguish
between: heavy smokers (more than 20 cigarettes per day) which account for 40,9% of
daily smokers; mean smokers (10 to 20 cigarettes per day) which are 40,1%o fd a i l y
smokers and moderate smokers (1 to 9 cigarettes per day), about 19% of daily smokers.
Heavy smokers are concentrated in Southern Italy and the Islands (46,2% in the South
and 45,2% in the Islands).
In Italy, in the year 2000, 22,2% of young people aged 14t o2 4( a bo u t1.600.000 people)
have declared to smoke. Young smokers are concentrated in Northern and Central Italy.
80,5% of young smokers have begun smoking between 14a n d18. The smoking habit of
the parents is believed to aﬀect heavily the smoking habit of the children: only 17,1%o f
children with non-smoking parents are smokers. The smoking behaviour of the mother
seems to aﬀect more heavily the smoking attitude of the children: 31,3% of smoking
children have the mother as the only smoking parent, against 22,2% of cases where the
10father is the only smoking parent.
Second hand smokers (i.e. non smokers that live with at least one smoker and are
therefore exposed to smoke) in Italy are about 12.500.000. Three quarters of them (73,1%)
live with one smoker and 23,4% is exposed to two smokers. Among second hand smokers
the children are more than 4 millions; 1.552.000 of them is less than 6 years old; 2.405.000
is aged between 6 and 13. About half of the children aged between 0 and 13 lives with
at least one smoker (Lega Italiana per la Lotta contro i Tumori, 2002).
3.1 Tobacco consumption
According to ISTAT data (2002a), households expenditure on Tobacco, at constant 1995
prices, has grown between 1982 and 1986 from 20.627 billions Lire to 21.361 billions
L i r ea n dh a sd e c r e a s e ds t e a d i l yb e t w e e n1987 and 1995 from 19.923 billions Lire to
17.935 billions Lire. Since then aggregate households expenditure on Tobacco has almost
remained stable (up to 1999) at 18.000 billions Lire. However, this decrease is likely to be
due, at least partly, to the rapid increase in cigarette smuggling, estimated to have grown
by about 800% between 1985 and 1993 and to account for about 13% of all cigarettes
consumed.
3.2 Tobacco Control Measures
The advertisement of Tobacco products has been banned in Italy since 1962 (L. 10A p r i l
1962 n. 165). A 1991 decree (D.M. 30 November 1991 n. 425) has implemented an E.U.
directive on television advertising and prohibits both direct and indirect advertising of
Tobacco products on television. This decree includes a ban on television sponsorship.
A sentence of the European Court of Justice of 5 October 2000 has repealed the E.U.
Directive 98/43 aimed at banning all advertising and sponsorship of Tobacco products,
although this measure does not interfere with related laws implemented by member coun-
tries.
Smoking is banned in the following areas (L. 11 November 1975 n. 584): hospital
wards, school classrooms, closed premises used for public meetings, cinemas and theatres,
museums, libraries and reading rooms open to the public, art galleries open to the public.
The D.M. 18M a y1976 has extended the ban to public administration areas open to the
public and to Universities, and the D.P.R. 11 July 1980 n. 753 has further extended it to
train coaches and waiting rooms. The circular of the Ministry of Health dated 28 March
112001 n. 4 furtherly widens the number of areas where smoking is banned.
As to working environments, the D.P.R. 19M a r c h1956 n. 303 bounds employers to
guarantee their employees a suﬃcient supply of clean air at the work place even with
the help of purifying plants. The D.Lgs. 19 September 1994 n. 626 compels employers
to adopt any precautionary measures to preserve employees from health or safety risks
related to their working environment. Finally the Constitutional Court sentence of 20
December 1996 n. 399 establishes a link between the D.Legs. 626 and smoking behaviour:
the employer must adopt any precautionary measure to avoid health damages arising to
employees from second hand smoking. Since 26 June 2002 the D.Legs 626 has been
further reinforced by the inclusion of second hand smoke among carcinogenic substances
that cause health risks in working environments. Moreover, Tobacco smoke has been
included among those substances from which employees should be preserved in their
working environment.
A new ban on smoking in public places has been recently approved by the Italian
Parliament with the Law of 16 January 2003 n. 3, which forbids smoking in every public
place including bars and restaurants. Transgressors can be charged with a ￿ne of up to
2000 Euros and local authorities can introduce inspectors in charge of monitoring the
enforcement of the Law. The Law will come into force after one and a half years since
its publication in the Oﬃcial Gazette.
This overview of the Italian smoking regulation reveals that public policy strongly
relies on command and control measures, rather than on economic incentives, to af-
fect smoking behaviour. More speci￿cally, there seems to be an attempt at associating
smoking behaviour with some kind of social discomfort. It is true that the ￿nancial law
approved for the year 2003 (L. 27 December 2002 n. 289) has introduced increases in the
excise rates on cigarettes, but this measure is justi￿ed on revenues￿ grounds, as a source
of additional public revenues to ￿nance research, which relies on a supposed unelastic
demand response to Tobacco price changes. When public health is at stake, the preferred
economic policy measure is regulation, as it has been just shown. This observation seems
to point out that individual smoking behaviour in Italy is believed to be rather insensitive
to price changes. Should this not be the case a stronger reliance on price mechanisms
that aﬀect smoking behaviour could perhaps be observed.
12Tobacco control measures in Italy
Bans on smoking
- L. 584-1975: it bans smoking in hospital wards, school classrooms, cinemas and theatres
libraries and reading rooms, art galleries;
-D . M .18M a y1976: the ban is extended to public administration areas and Universities;
- D.P.R. 753-1980: it further extends the ban on smoking to train coaches and waiting rooms;
- L. 3-2003: it forbids smoking in every public place including bars and restaurants;
Advertising
-L .165-1962: ban on advertising of Tobacco products;
- D.M. 425-1991: ban on both direct and indirect advertising and sponsorship of Tobacco products on television;
Work place
- D.P.R. 303-1956: employers must guarantee a suﬃcient supply of clean air at the work place;
- D.L. 626-1994: employers must preserve employees from health or safety risks related to working environments;
-C . C . S .3 9 9 - 1996: employers must avoid health damages arising to employees from second hand smoking;
- T.A.R. sentence 723-1997: it establishes a direct link between some pathologies onset and second hand smoking;
4 Estimating Tobacco Demand with Panel Data
4.1 Data
To estimate the demand model we use annual data from 1972 to 2000 on Tobacco sales
from the State Monopoly supplied by ISTAT, the Italian National Statistical Institute, for
the twenty Italian regions. The data made available in this Survey include the quantity
(in quintals) of Tobacco products, both national and non national, sold by the State
Monopoly to the retailers in each region; the quantity of non national Tobacco products
sold; the revenues of the State Monopoly in Lire and the average per-capita expenditure
in Lire. The Tobacco products included are: cigarettes, cigars, smoking Tobacco, snuﬀ
and cut Tobacco.
Additional variables used are: ￿nal consumption expenditures (including expendi-
ture in durable goods) of Italian families, per region, supplied by ISTAT, as a proxy of
disposable income; the total regional population calculated in the middle of each year;
the regional polulation aged 14 or more, calculated in the middle of each year, and the
13quantity of foreign Tobacco consumption, in inverse ratio, used as a proxy of smuggling
Tobacco. Finally, we use a regional consumer price index (CPI) normalised in 1995, also
supplied by ISTAT.
The real per-capita sales of Tobacco (quantity per head per year) to a person of 14
years or older is our dependent variable, Ci,t,where i =1 ,..,20 denotes the Italian region
and t = 1972,..,2000 denotes the year. To take account of diﬀerences in the consumption
pro￿le across regions we have also introduced dummy variables, N1−N20,a s s o c i a t e dt o
the regions. Inclusion of an intercept term brings to the exclusion of one space dummy
to avoid the dummy variable trap.
Our pseudo panel covers 20 regions over 29 years; we thus have 580 observations (29
years times 20 regions) for each variable. These data can be organised in two diﬀerent
ways. If r is the region and t the year considered, one way is to line up annual data (y=1-
2 9 )o ne a c hr e g i o n( r = 1-20) so that the slowest varying index is the space dimension. This
is the so called ￿pooled￿ data format used, in general, when we assume that observations
are independent across both the time and the space dimension. When using complex lag
structures or the GMM estimator, the ￿panel￿ data format is used, where we have the
data one observation per region. In this case, we will line up observations on each region
(r=1-20) for each year (y=1-29) so that the slowest varying index is the time dimension8.
A summary of variables de￿nitions, means and standard deviations of the main vari-
a b l e si sp r e s e n t e di nt a b l e2 .
4.2 Estimation
We estimate the following model:
Ci,t= α + β1Ci,t−1+β2Pi,t+β3Ci,t+1+β4Yi,t+β5FCi,t + ui,t (6)
with i =1 ,..,20; t =1 ,..,29 and where:
Ci,t is the real per-capita sales of Tobacco of individual i (aged 14 or older), in year t,
e x p r e s s e di nk gp e rp e r s o n ;Pi,t is the real price of Tobacco at time t in region i de￿ated
by the CPI; Yi,t is the real per-capita ￿nal consumption expenditure used as a proxy of
disposable income and FC i,t is the per-capita consumption of foreign Tobacco, in inverse
ratio, of a person i (aged 14 or older), in year t, expressed in Kg per person.
8See TSP 4.5 user￿s guide, chapter 15, for details.
14The disturbance term ui,t is speci￿ed as a one-way error-component model: ui,t =
￿i + vi,t,w h e r et h e￿i denotes the region speci￿ce ﬀect that captures all those aspects
that are not considered explicitly as explanatory variables in the model and vi,t is a
remainder disturbance. The regional eﬀects can be assumed either ￿xed or random. The
OLS estimator produces consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients and of their standard
errors only when the regressors in equation (6) are exogenous and the error term is
homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated. When the error terms are correlated across
time for each spatial unit the OLS estimator produces consistent but ineﬃcient estimates
of the parameters of interest. In this case one can use the methodology proposed by
Balestra and Nerlove and known as the Random Eﬀects (RE) estimator. This implies
quasi-demeaning of the equation to be estimated so that the possibility of correlation
across time of the error term is phased out and the parameters￿ estimates are both
consistent and eﬃcient, provided that the individual eﬀect is random with respect to the
observed explanatory variables. However, when the individual eﬀect is correlated with the
explanatory variables the OLS nor the RE estimators produce consistent estimates. In
this case, as long as the regressors are strictly exogenous with respect to the time varying
error component, consistent parameters estimates can be obtained by taking individual
deviations from individual means, which leads to interpreting the individual eﬀects as
individual constants. This is called the Fixed Eﬀects estimator (FE). The FE or within
model assumes that there are common slopes, but each cross section unit has its own
intercept term modeled introducing dummy variables. What distinguishes the RE from
the FE model is that the time-invariant region speci￿ce ﬀect ￿i is uncorrelated with the
explanatory variables in the RE model, whereas it is correlated with the explanatory
variables in the FE model.
These estimators are valid when the regressors are stictly exogenous, but when some
of the regressors could be endogenous, as in our case, 2SLS and an appropriate set of
instruments should be used, i.e instruments that are uncorrelated with the time varying
error component. In our case, prices and income could be used as instruments. If Pt is
uncorrelated with ut for all t, then, in principle, all prices could be used as instruments
for each time period exploiting the numerous orthogonality conditions between Pt and
ut. With the FE and RE estimator this implies that a very strict exogeneity condition
must hold, i.e. that the time varying error component is uncorrelated with the instru-
ments used for all time periods considered. Unfortunately there are many cases in which
such a strict exogeneity condition does not hold. If the set of instruments we want to
15use is predetermined, but not strictly exogenous, as in our case, equation 6 cannot be
estimated using FE2SLS9, because the FE2SLS will be ineﬃcient unless T (the number
of time periods) tends to in￿nity. To overcome this problem one may use transformations
of the regression equation that leave predetermined variables valid as instruments. This
is the methodology followed by Arellano and Bond (1991)t h a tp r e s c r i b e daG M Me s t i -
mator. This estimator utilizes the orthogonality conditions that exist between the lagged
values of the dependent variable and the error term in a dynamic panel data model. In
this case one ￿rst diﬀerences the equation to be estimated. The GMM estimator is then
obtained by performing generalised least squares (GLS) on the diﬀerenced equation, after
pre-multiplying it by W 0,w h e r eW is a block diagonal matrix with [Pi,1,P i,2,...,Pi,T] in
each block. An alternative estimator is the one suggested by Keane e Runkle (1992)
who describe a forward-￿ltering transformation that also leaves predetermined variables
as valid instruments. This estimator, like the GMM estimator, produces both consistent
and eﬃcient estimates of the parameters of interest. It is based on insights obtained by
applying time series models to panel data. If a time series equation has serially correlated
errors and predetermined instruments, serial correlation can be eliminated by a transfor-
mation that makes the transformed dependent variable for time t a linear combination
of the values of the original dependent variable for time periods t and later (Keane and
Runkle, 1992, p. 4). This transformation preserves the orthogonality conditions implied
by the time series model and yields consistent and potentially more eﬃcient estimates of
the parameters.
4.3 Results
For our empirical implementation we estimate equation (6) where Tobacco consumption
at time t depends on its price, on the lagged and lead consumption, on disposable in-
come, on a proxy of smuggling and where the error term is modeled as a one-way error
component. The PANEL procedure in TSP4.5 produces OLS as well as Fixed-Eﬀects
and Random Eﬀects estimates, allowing to choose between the last two. The results are
shown in table 3. All standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent. We then perform
instrumental variables estimation using two sets of instruments: the ￿rst uses Pt,Y t,FC t
and two lags of them, as well as the regional dummies; the second set of instruments
9Av a r i a b l exi,t is said to be strictly exogenous if E [xi,t†i,s]=0for all t and s.I fE [xi,t†i,s] 6=0for
s<tbut E [xi,t†i,s]=0for s ≥ t the variable is said to be predetermined. Intuitively, if the error term
at time t has some feedback on the subsequent realizations of x then xi,t is a predetermined variable.
16adds future prices (Pt+1 Pt+2). The results are printed in table 4. When using the OLS
estimator, both the lagged and lead consumption term are positive and statistically sig-
ni￿cant, but the lead consumption term coeﬃcient is slightly higher than the lagged one
giving rise to a negative discount rate. The price coeﬃcient is also negative and statisti-
cally signi￿cant. A Hausman test for the choice between the FE and the RE estimator
accepts the null that the RE model is the one that better captures the relation between
the explanatory variables and the individual eﬀects. The parameters￿ values are very
similar in the three cases.
Estimating equation (6) using Fixed Eﬀects Two Stages Least Squares (FE2SLS),
produces statistically signi￿cant results for all the variables except for the lagged con-
sumption term (table 4, panel A) which also takes a negative sign. Moreover, the lead
consumption term coeﬃcient becomes much larger than the lagged one, thus contradict-
ing the theory. The set of instruments used at the ￿rst stage includes: the regional
dummies, two lags of prices, income and the proxy of smuggling plus their levels. When
two leads of the price are included in the instruments￿ set, the results do not change much
except for the lagged consumption coeﬃcient which now takes a positive sign (table 4,
panel B)10.
The FE2SLS results give rise to a negative interest rate, but we can calculate the
price elasticities of demand at the sample mean. Their values are -0.43 for the short run
elasticity and -0.45 for the long run one.
Parameters￿ estimates produced by the GMM estimator are all statistically signi￿cant
and have the right sign, both when the price lead is excluded from the instruments￿ set
and when it is included. However, the lead consumption coeﬃcient is slightly larger than
the lagged consumption coeﬃcient and the price elasticities of demand calculated at the
sample mean are exceedingly high.
As to the Forward-Filter First Diﬀerence 2SLS Estimator, when the future price is
included in the instruments and when using instruments in ￿rst diﬀerences (table 4, panel
B) all the coeﬃcients have the right sign and are statistically signi￿cant. However, the
10BGM (1994) found that excluding the lead price of the dependent variable from the set of instruments
led to negative interest rates and also that future prices were not legitimate instruments. Nevertheless
they opted for the inclusion of this variable in the set of instruments. They justify this choice on several
grounds. First of all, excluding this variable may lead to poor instrumentation; moreover, consumers may
have relevant information to forecast future cigarette prices: if a tax increase is announced in advance,
consumers may anticipate the price change well in advance. Moreover, they found that models that
use future prices as instruments are much less sensitive to changes in the speci￿cation of the structural
demand equation than those that exclude these instruments (BGM, p. 409).
17lead consumption term is higher than the lagged one. Even in this case, however, we are
unable to obtain sensible price elasticities of demand. These results do not change much
when we use instruments in levels.
This ￿rst set of results allows us to make some considerations. In the OLS, FE and
the RE models, both consumption coeﬃcients are statistically signi￿cant and have the
right sign, but the lead consumption coeﬃcient is slightly higher than the lagged one.
When using consistent and eﬃcient estimators (table 4) and when the price leads are
included in the instruments￿ set, the lead and lagged consumption coeﬃcients are always
signi￿cant, but even in this case the lead consumption term is higher than the lagged one
giving rise to a negative interest rate. The lead consumption term coeﬃcient is positive
and signi￿cant in all cases. Therefore we cannot accept the null hypothesis that the
lead consumption variable￿s coeﬃcient is zero, implying that the representative consumer
behind our data is forward looking. However, the results are not fully consistent with
the theory, because we do not obtain reasonable values for the subjective rate of time
preference. We can calculate price elasticities of demand only in one case and the long
run price elasticity of demand is slightly higher (in absolute value) than the short run
one. Baltagi and Griﬃn (2001, p. 454) suggest that before the rational addiction model
can be widely accepted plausible and reasonable estimates of the implied discount rate
are needed. They also suggest that the implausible discount rates may be obtained due to
the use of aggregate rather than individual data and that the use of microdata seems the
most promising approach. This ￿rst set of results does not allow a clear acceptance of the
theory, although we do reject the null hypothesis that the lead consumption coeﬃcient
is zero. We believe that this outcome is not to be attributed to methodological pitfalls,
but rather to the poor informative content of the data. The idea that our data re￿ect
the consumer￿s choice does not seem fully convincing, as our dependent variable is the
quantity sold by the State Monopoly to the tobacconists. Therefore it does not re￿ect
the true Tobacco demand which is the result of an individual maximization process, but
simply what the retailers consider to be the likely future Tobacco demand they will face.
4.4 Estimate of the Myopic demand function
Non-rational or myopic models of addiction fail to consider the impact of future con-
sumption on current consumption, i.e. they are entirely backward looking. Current
consumption depends only on current price, lagged consumption, disposable income and
current events. The pioneering empirical work is by Houthakker and Taylor (1970) who
18estimated single equation dynamic demand functions for many goods including Tobacco.
The source of dynamic behaviour is the stock of habits: St =( 1−δ)St−1 +Ct where δ is
the rate at which habits decay. Assuming a 100% rate of decay (δ =1 )o ft h es t o c ko f
habits produces a linear equation to be estimated of the form:
Ci,t = α + β1Ci,t−1 + β2Pi,t + β3Yi,t + FC i,t + ui,t (7)
where the subscript i denotes the ith region
(i =1 ,..,20) and the subscript t denotes the time.
The coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable, in this restricted model, can also
be interpreted as the speed of adjustment to the steady state level of consumption in a
partial adjustment model, as Baltagi and Levin (1986 and 1992) for instance do. However
Cameron (1998, p. 53) ￿nds that the habit persistence interpretation of the coeﬃcient on
the lagged dependent variable is more plausible than the adjustment costs interpretation
(underlying the partial adjustment model) when the good in question is an addictive
good.
The partial adjustment model can be estimated by OLS, because it assumes that the
lagged dependent variable can be treated as given, that is, as being uncorrelated with
the equations￿ error terms. In this case OLS estimation is consistent (Verbeek, 2000, p.
280).
Table 5 shows the results obtained from estimation of the myopic model of addiction.
The lagged consumption term is statistically signi￿cant and has the right sign. However,
the price coeﬃcient takes a positive sign. The Hausman test supports the Fixed Eﬀects
m o d e l ,b u te v e ni nt h i sc a s e ,t h ep r i c ec o e ﬃcient has a positive sign.
5 Estimating Tobacco Demand with Time Series
5.1 Data
In this paragraph we estimate the rational addiction model using times series rather than
panel data. We use annual aggregate data on households ￿nal consumption expenditure
on Tobacco products from 1960 to 2002 which have been obtained from the ISTAT
Italian National Accounts. Additional variables used are: the consumer price index (IPC)
excluding Tobacco; the Tobacco price is a price index obtained by dividing the index of
Tobacco price normalised in 1995 by the CPI normalised in 1995; the total population
19calculated in the middle of each year and population aged 14 or older calculated in the
m i d d l eo fe a c hy e a r 11.
The real per capita expenditure of Tobacco and related products (of persons aged
14 or older) is our dependent variable. We estimate the pure Becker model of rational
addiction where current Tobacco consumption depends on consumption at time t−1 and
t+1a n do nt h er e a lp r i c ea tt i m et and on a constant term. The equation to be estimated
is thus:
Ct= α + β1Ct−1+β2Ct+1+β3Pt + ut (8)
This equation is estimated with OLS as well as with 2SLS to take account of the
endogeneity problem highlighted in paragraph 2.2.
5.2 Results
The results of this second attempt are shown in table 6. In the OLS case the lead and
lagged consumption coeﬃcients are both positive and higly signi￿cant although the lead
consumption term is slightly higher that the lagged one. The price coeﬃcient has a
negative sign, as expected, but it is not signi￿cant. When equation (8) is estimated using
2SLS all the coeﬃcients are statistically signi￿cant. The lead consumption coeﬃcient is
smaller than the lagged consumption coeﬃcient, as suggested by the theory, giving rise
to a positive rate of time preference. All standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent.
The instruments￿ set used at the ￿rst stage includes two lags and two leads of the price,
besides the current price and the constant. Figure 1 shows actual and ￿tted values of
the index of per capita Tobacco expenditure normalised in 1995. Per capita Tobacco
expenditure has been growing steadily from 1960 to 1980 and has remained stable at
1980 levels until about 1985. From 1985 till about 1995 it has decreased going back to
1975 levels, while since 1995 it shows a new increasing trend, despite the strict regulation
on smoking implemented recently in Italy.
Table 7 shows, instead, short and long run price elasticities of demand for Tobacco and
the rate of time preference calculated from the 2SLS estimates of the rational addiction
model. Elasticities are calculated at the mean point of each decade under consideration.
Consistently with the theory, the short run price elasticity of demand is always lower
11The population time series has been supplied by prof. Petrioli of the University of Siena.
20than the long run one. The long run price elasticity of demand is greater than one only
during the ￿rst decade and approximates one over the last decade under consideration.
From 1972 to 1995 it is rather low ranging from -0.66 to -0.87. According to the rational
addiction model, the marginal utility of income is a multiplying factor in the current
price coeﬃcient (Escario and Molina, 2001,p .2 13), so that an increase in the marginal
utility of income will produce a greater increase in the price coeﬃcient. This implies that
rich people, who possess a lower marginal utility of income, will be less sensitive to price
changes than people with lower income and a higher marginal utility of income.
Figure 2 shows the short and long run price elasticities of demand obtained from the
rational addiction model over time. The demand for Tobacco product appears to be
highlysensitivetopricechangesoverthesixtiesandtheseventies,whenthemeanlevel
of income in Italy was lower, than during the eighties for instance. From 1980 to 1990
both elasticities remain almost stable to rather low levels consistently with a higher, on
average, level of income in those years. The LRE starts to increase again from 1992
onward, which coincides with a period of austerity and restrictive economic policy in
Italy. The evolution over time of price elasticities of demand seems thus to be consistent
with the predictions of the rational addiction model.
5.3 Simulating a Price Change
A sal a s te x e r c i s ew eh a v es i m u l a t e dt h ee ﬀects on consumption of permanent price
changes over the period 2003-2010. We assume three diﬀe r e n ts c e n a r i o s : a )t h er e a l
price of Tobacco is only slightly increasing at the rate of 1% per year during the period
2003-2010; b) the price is increasing at the rate of 5% per year; c) the price is increasing
at the rate of 10% per year. Time series used to estimate equation (8) are determined
endogenously as follows. We ￿t Ct with OLS from 1962 to 2000 using two leads and two
lags of the prices, besides the constant, as regressors:
Ct = α0+α1Pt−2+α2Pt−1+α3Pt + α4Pt+1+α5Pt+2 + ut
For the years 2001-2008, Ct is generated using as prices those simulated according
to the three hypothetical scenarios described above. The values of Ct thus estimated
are used, in place of the eﬀective values, to estimate the rational addiction equation (8)
from 1962 to 2008. This procedure implies that Tobacco demand ad each time period is
simulated dinamically taking into account the available information on past and future
prices. This seems more consistent with the theory than the common practice adopted in
21empirical works on rational addiction of using eﬀective values of Ct to estimate equation
(8). The results of the simulation are shown in ￿gure 3: the variable C represents actual
values of Tobacco demand, whereas C1, C2 and C3 are the values of Tobacco demand
simulated dinamically and where diﬀerent price scenarios for the years 2001-2007 are
assumed.
The eﬀect of expected permanent price changes over a number of years appears to
be rather strong. When an increase of 10% per year in the price of Tobacco is assumed,
the level of per capita Tobacco expenditure goes back to levels preceding 1960. Even
when smaller annual price increases are assumed, the curb in Tobacco demand appears
to be relevant. The strongest implication of the rational addiction model is therefore that
announcements of future price increases could achieve large demand decreases because
smokers take the future into account when making their own current smoking decisions.
6 Final considerations
In this paper we test the Rational Model of Addiction on Italian data to see whether
the idea of rationality in addiction is supported in Italy as it is, for instance, in the
United States. Previous works of this kind have been carried out in Europe only in
Spain (Escario and Molina, 2001) and in Greece (Cameron, 1997). The model is tested
on panel data as well as on time series. When dealing with Panel data eﬃcient and
consistent estimators (as suggested by Baltagy and Griﬃn, 2001) are used to overcome
the econometric problems faced in presence of endogenous or predetermined variables.
A ￿rst set of estimates, based on panel data, seems to support the rational addiction
model, but the results are not clearcut. On one hand the coeﬃcient on the lead con-
sumption term is almost always positive and signi￿cant implying that the representative
consumer behind our data is actually ￿forward looking￿. As a consequence, the long run
price elasticity of demand should be higher than those obtained from alternative models
of addiction and price mechanisms could be used more extensively to curb Tobacco con-
sumption as they turn out to be eﬀective means of reducing demand. On the other hand,
however, the lead consumption term is often considerably higher than the lagged one
giving rise to a negative discount rate and the value obtained for both coeﬃcents leads
to meaningless elasticities of demand, except for one case. As already pointed out by
Baltagi and Griﬃn (2001 p. 454) we feel that the rational addiction model may represent
as i g n i ￿cant improvement over models of myopic addiction. However plausible and sta-
22tistically signi￿cant estimates of the implied discount rate and of the relevant elasticites
are needed. We feel that these results can be attributed to the quality of the data used.
Aggregate data, like those we use, do not seem likely to provide sharp estimates of the
discount rate. Also the idea that these data should re￿ect the consumer￿s choice does not
seem convincing, as our dependent variable is the quantity of Tobacco products sold by
the State Monopoly to the tobacconists. Therefore it does not re￿ect the true Tobacco
demand which is the result of an individual maximization process, but simply what the
retailers consider to be the likely future Tobacco demand they will face.
In a second attempt at estimating the rational addiction model we use time series on
per capita households expenditures on Tobacco products from 1960 to 2002 taken from the
National Accounts. In this case the data strongly support the rational addiction model.
The long run price elasticity of demand is in the range -1.95 (during the 1962-1971 decade)
to -0.58 (during the 1982-1991 decade); the rate of time preference is about 23%. A
simulation exercise is also carried out with these data. Three diﬀerent hypothesis of price
changes over the period 2003-2010 are introduced and Tobacco demand is endougenously
determined through a dynamic simulation that uses past and future prices to determine
Tobacco demand. The demand for Tobacco appears to be very sensitive to future price
changes. Announcements of future permanent price changes seems to be an eﬀective
means of modifying smoking behaviour.
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26Table 1: Price Elasticity of Demand for Tobacco from previous Italian Studies
Study Elasticity type Elasticity value
Caiumi (1992) long run -0.34
Jones-Giannoni Mazzi (1996) long run -0.33
Rizzi (2000) long run -0.75
Rizzi-Balli (2002) short run -0.88
long run -1.26
27Table 2: De￿nitions, Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of Variables
Variable De￿nition, mean (M), Standard Deviation (SD)
Ct =( TB/POP14)100 Per capita (of persons aged 14 or older) Tobacco consumption
p e ry e a ri nK gp e rp e r s o n( M = 2 . 0 6 7 ,S D = 0 . 3 3 8 )
Pt =( RIC/IPR)/TB Real price of national and foreign Tobacco
expressed in Millions Lire per quintals (M=0.605, SD=0.346)
Yt = 1000(YD/ IPR )/POP14 Real per capita disposable income per year
expressed in Millions Lire per capita (M=29850, SD=37495)
CETt =1 /TBEt Aggregate Quantity Foreign Tobacco (in Quintals),
in inverse ratio, as a proxy of smuggling (M=0.0002, SD=0.0004)
TB t Quantity of national + foreign Tobacco products sold by the State
Monopoly to retailers (in quintals) per year (M=47692.51; SD=37406.703)
RICt Proceeds of the State Monopoly from sales to the retailers
(in Millions Lire) per year (M=448033.157; SD=543277.420)
YD t Households￿ ￿nal consumption expenditure per year used as a proxy
of disposable income (in Billions Lire) (M=29850.430; SD=37495.442)
POP14 Population aged 14 or older calculated in the middle of each year
IPR Regional consumer price index (1995=100)
TBE t Quantity of Foreign Tobacco products sold by the State
Monopoly to retailers (in quintals) per year (M=20186.035; SD=18274.89)
28Table 3: Estimates of the Rational Addiction Model
Dependent variable Ct (t-statistics in parentheses)
Ci,t−1 Ci,t+1 Pi,t Yi,t FCi,t Constant R2
OLS 0.497 0.501 -0.003 0.000 -1.067 0.030 0.98
(25.56) (28.00) (-2.077) (0.940) (-0.145) (1.159)
Fixed-Eﬀects 0.494 0.494 -0.003 0.000 -0.263 - 0.98
(23.05) (23.86) (-1.708) (0.219) (-0.018)
F(19,515)=0.0916
p-value(1.000)
Random-Eﬀects 0.497 0.501 -0.003 0.000 1.105 0.023 0.98





29Table 4: Estimates of the Rational Addiction Model
Dependent variable Ct (t-statistics in parentheses)
Ci,t−1 Ci,t+1 Pi,t Yi,t FC i,t R2 rS R E L R E
A. Future price excluded from the instruments
1.F E 2 S L S - 0 . 146 0.918 -0.025 0.011 -112.6 0.94
(-1.111) (6.828) (-3.437) (2.726) (-1.845)
2a. FD2SLS-KR∗ 0.372 0.653 -0.035 0.027 -11.69 0.99
(21.09) (20.99) (-8.182) (6.941)( 1.376)
2b.FD2SLS-KR∗∗ 0.386 0.628 -0.034 0.027 7.591 0.99
(47.10) (26.27) (-11.95) (11.12) (1.027)
GMM 0.439 0.509 -0.006 0.001 -2.132
(584.8) (846.9) (-226.5) (64.67) (-3.206)
B. Future price included in the instruments
1. FE2SLS 0.057 0.553 -0.023 0.002 -144.2 0.95 -0.44 -0.43 -0.45
(0.443) (4.631) (-3.754) (0.565) (-2.324) (-1.920) (-4.103) (-6.684)
2a. FD2SLS-KR∗ 0.384 0.647 -0.033 0.025 7.954 0.99
(38.94) (20.14) (-9.429) (6.877) (0.898)
2b.FD2SLS-KR∗∗ 0.391 0.627 -0.034 0.027 5.668 0.99
(67.76) (25.21)( - 11.88) (10.70) (0.748)
GMM 0.453 0.498 -0.005 0.000 -11.49
(729.3) (1058) (-225.1) (25.10) (-24.28)
Note: regional dummies are included in all models, but their estimates are not reported to save space.
* Instruments in levels; ** Instruments in ￿rst diﬀerences to account for possible integrated processes;
standard errors are heteroskedastic consistent.
30T a b l e5 :E s t i m a t e so ft h eM y o p i cM o d e l .
Dependent variable Ct (t-statistics in parentheses)
Ci,t−1 Pi,t Yi,t FC i,t Constant R2
OLS 0.979 0.003 -0.004 30.05 0.076 0.94
(67.71)( 1.756) (-3.482) (2.525) (1.905)
Fixed-Eﬀects 0.892 0.008 -0.014 22.69 - 0.94
(42.54) (3.326) (-6.972) (1.043)
Random-Eﬀects 0.950 0.005 -0.007 43.68 0.173 0.94




31Table 6: Estimates of the Rational Addiction Model with
Time Series. Dependent variable Ct (t-statistics in parentheses)
Ct−1 Ct+1 Pt CR 2
OLS 0.476 0.483 -0.046 0.085 0.99
(7.458) (6.673) (-1.374) (1.305)
2SLS 0.500 0.404 -0.91 0.181 0.99
(9.047) (3.697) (-1.817) (1.628)
All standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent.
Table 7: Short and Long Price Elasticities of demand
rational addiction model (t-statistics in parentheses)*
SRE LRE r
1962 − 1971 -0.59 -1.96 0.24
(-4.665) (-5.522) (0.515)
1972 − 1981 -0.20 -0.66
(-4.665) (-5.522)
1982 − 1991 -0.18 -0.58
(-4.665) (-5.522)
1992 − 1996 -0.27 -0.87
(-4.665) (-5.522)
1997 − 2000 -0.30 -0.99
(-4.665) (-5.522)
* Standard errors for elasticities have been computed using ANALYZ in TSP45.








C  C(fitted) 
Figure 1: Real and Fitted values of per capita Tobacco Expenditure (ra model, 2SLS)






SRE  LRE 
Figure 2: Short (SRE) and Long (LRE) run Price Elasticities of Demand (RA model,
2SLS)















Figure 3: The Eﬀects of Announced, Permanent Price Changes on Tobacco Demand
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